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This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information
games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information.
A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete
information game where payoﬀs are almost always given by the complete information
game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the
set. This paper provides suﬃcient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in
terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions and shows that the suﬃcient
conditions generalize the existing suﬃcient conditions for the robustness of equilibria.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Outcomes of a game with common knowledge of payoﬀsm a yb ev e r yd i ﬀerent from out-
comes of the game with a “small” departure from common knowledge, as demonstrated
by Rubinstein (1989) and Carlsson and van Damme (1993). This observation lead Kajii
and Morris (1997a) to study what equilibria of complete information games are not much
aﬀected by weakening of the assumption of common knowledge; they studied the robust-
ness of equilibria to incomplete information. An equilibrium of a complete information
game is robust if every incomplete information game with payoﬀsa l m o s ta l w a y sg i v e n
by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to
the equilibrium.
Kajii and Morris (1997b) demonstrated that robustness can be seen as a very strong
reﬁnement of Nash equilibria. The reﬁnements literature examines what happens to a
given Nash equilibrium in perturbed version of the complete information game. A weak
class of reﬁnements requires only that the Nash equilibrium continues to be equilibrium
in some nearby perturbed game. The notion of perfect equilibria by Selten (1975) is
the leading example of this class. A stronger class requires that the Nash equilibrium
continues to be played in all perturbed nearby games. The notion of stable equilibria
by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) or that of strictly perfect equilibria by Okada (1981)
are leading examples of this class. Robustness belongs to the latter, stronger class of
reﬁnements. Moreover, robustness to incomplete information allows an extremely rich
set of perturbed games. In particular, while Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) allowed only
independent action trembles across players, the deﬁnition of robustness leads to highly
correlated trembles and thus an even stronger reﬁnement. Indeed, Kajii and Morris
(1997a) constructed an example in the spirit of Rubinstein (1989) to show that even
a game with a unique Nash equilibrium, which is strict, may fail to have any robust
equilibrium.
Kajii and Morris (1997a) and Ui (2001) provided suﬃcient conditions for the ro-
bustness of equilibria. Kajii and Morris (1997a) introduced the concept of p-dominance
where p =( p1,...,p n) is a vector of probabilities. An action proﬁle is a p-dominant
equilibrium if each player’s action is a best response whenever he assigns probability
at least pi to his opponents choosing actions according to the action proﬁle. Kajii and
Morris (1997a) showed that a p-dominant equilibrium with
P
i pi < 1 is robust. Ui
2(2001) considered robust equilibria of potential games, a class of complete information
games possessing potential functions. As considered by Monderer and Shapley (1996), a
potential function is a function on the action space such that it incorporates information
about players’ preferences over the action space that is suﬃcient to determine all the
equilibria. Ui (2001) showed that the action proﬁle that uniquely maximizes a potential
function is robust.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a new suﬃcient condition for the robustness.
The condition uniﬁes and generalizes the suﬃcient conditions provided by Kajii and
Morris (1997a) and Ui (2001).1 Furthermore, the condition applies not only to the
robustness of equilibria but also the robustness of sets of equilibria. This paper introduces
generalized potential functions and provides the condition in terms of argmax sets of
generalized potential functions.
We start by deﬁning the robustness concept as a set valued one,2 the robustness of
sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information
game is robust if every incomplete information game with payoﬀsa l m o s ta l w a y sg i v e n
by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to
some equilibrium in the set. If a robust set is a singleton then the equilibrium is robust
in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997a, 1997b). Because some games have no robust
equilibria, it is natural to ask if a set of equilibria is robust.
We then introduce generalized potential functions. A generalized potential function
is a function on a covering of the action space, a collection of subsets of the action space
such that the union of the subsets is the action space. It incorporates some information
about players’ preferences over the collection of subsets. We call each element of the
domain of a generalized potential function an action subspace. If an action subspace
maximizes a generalized potential function and the generalized potential function has
a unique maximum then we call the action subspace a generalized potential maximizer
(GP-maximizer).
The main results state that there exists a correlated equilibrium assigning probability
1 to a GP-maximizer and that the set of such correlated equilibria is robust. This
1This uniﬁcation of conditions based on potential arguments and conditions based on p-dominance
may be of interest in other contexts. For example, potential arguments are widely used in evolutionary
contexts and Sandholm (2001) has a p-dominance suﬃcient condition for almost global convergence.
2Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) were the ﬁrst to propose making sets of equilibria the objects of a
theory of equilibrium reﬁnements.
3immediately implies that if a GP-maximizer consists of one action proﬁle then the action
proﬁle is a robust equilibrium. It should be noted that a robust set induced by the GP-
maximizer condition is not always minimal. A robust set is minimal if no robust set is
a proper subset of the robust set. In this paper, we do not explore the problem of how
to identify minimal robust sets.
It is not so straightforward to ﬁnd GP-maximizers from the deﬁnition. One reason
is that, as we will see later, a complete information game may have multiple generalized
potential functions with diﬀerent domains. We restrict attention to generalized potential
functions with two special classes of domains. One class of domains are unordered parti-
tions of action spaces. We introduce best-response potential functions as functions over
the partitions such that the best response correspondence of the function deﬁned over
the partition coincides with that of a complete information game. Potential functions of
Monderer and Shapley (1996) form a special class of best-response potential functions
with the ﬁnest partitions.3 We show that a best-response potential function is a gen-
eralized potential function. The other class of domains are those induced by ordered
partitions of action spaces. We introduce monotone potential functions as functions over
the partitions such that the best response correspondence of the function deﬁned over
the partition and that of a complete information game has some monotonic relationship
with respect to the order relation of the partition. We show that a monotone potential
function naturally induces a generalized potential function where the domain consists of
intervals of the ordered partition. We then show that a p-dominant equilibrium with
P
i pi < 1 is the induced GP-maximizer, by which the discussion of Kajii and Morris
(1997a) and that of Ui (2001) are uniﬁed.
Rosenthal (1973) was the ﬁrst to use potential functions in noncooperative game
theory.4 He used potential functions as tools for ﬁnding pure-action Nash equilibria.5
Recent studies such as Blume (1993, 1997), Ui (1997, 2001), and Hofbauer and Sorger
3Morris and Ui (2002) demonstrated that the class of best-response potential functions with the ﬁnest
partitions are much larger than the class of potential functions.
4In cooperative game theory, Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) introduced potential functions. The poten-
tial functions of Monderer and Shapley (1996) can be regarded as an extension of the potential functions
of Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) to noncooperative games, as demonstrated by Ui (2000).
5In traﬃc network theory, non-atomic games similar to the ﬁnite games of Rosenthal (1973) are studied
and non-atomic potential functions are used to calculate pure-action Nash equilibria. See Oppenheim
(1995), for example.
4(1999) used potential functions as tools for ﬁnding Nash equilibria satisfying some cri-
teria for equilibrium selection. Since a narrow class of games admit potential functions,
attempts have been made to introduce tools for a broader class of games. Monderer and
Shapley (1996) introduced ordinal potential functions6 and generalized ordinal potential
functions. Voorneveld (2000) introduced best-response potential functions,7 which are
diﬀerent from best-response potential functions in this paper. These functions inherit
ordinal aspects of potential functions and serve as tools for the former use (ﬁnding pure-
action equilibria). They are in clear contrast to generalized potential functions in this
paper, which serve as tools for the latter use (reﬁning equilibria).
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes robust sets of equilibria.
Section 3 introduces generalized potential functions. Section 4 provides the main results.
Section 5 discusses best-response potential functions and Section 6 discusses monotone
potential functions. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2R o b u s t S e t s
A complete information game consists of a ﬁnite set of players N,aﬁnite action set Ai
for i ∈ N,a n dap a y o ﬀ function gi : A → R for i ∈ N where A =
Q
i∈N Ai.W ew r i t e
A−i =
Q
j6=i Aj and a−i =( aj)j6=i ∈ A−i. We also write, for S ∈ 2N, AS =
Q
i∈S Ai
and aS =( ai)i∈S ∈ AS. Because we will ﬁx N and A throughout the paper, we simply
denote a complete information game by g =( gi)i∈N.
An action distribution µ ∈ ∆(A) is a correlated equilibrium of g if, for each i ∈ N,
X
a−i∈A−i





for all ai,a 0
i ∈ Ai.8 An action distribution µ ∈ ∆(A) is a Nash equilibrium of g if it is a
correlated equilibrium and, for all a ∈ A, µ(a)=
Q
i∈N µi(ai) where µi ∈ ∆(Ai).W ea l s o
say that a ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium if µ ∈ ∆(A) with µ(a)=1is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider an incomplete information game with the set of players N and the action
space A.L e t Ti be a countable set of types of player i ∈ N. The state space is
T =
Q
i∈N Ti.W e w r i t e T−i =
Q
j6=i Tj and t−i =( tj)j6=i ∈ T−i.L e t P ∈ ∆(T) be
6See also Kukushkin (1999).
7Ui (1997) considered similar functions in the context of stochastic evolutionary games.
8For any ﬁnite or countable set S, ∆(S) denotes the set of all probability distributions on S.
5the prior probability distribution on T with
P
t−i∈T−i P(ti,t −i) > 0 for all i ∈ N and
ti ∈ Ti.A p a y o ﬀ function of player i ∈ N is a bounded function ui : A × T → R.
B e c a u s ew ew i l lﬁx T, N,a n dA throughout the paper, we simply denote an incomplete
information game by (u,P) where u =( ui)i∈N.
A (mixed) strategy of player i ∈ N is a mapping σi : Ti → ∆(Ai).W e w r i t e
Σi for the set of strategies of player i. The strategy space is Σ =
Q
i∈N Σi.W e w r i t e
Σ−i =
Q
j6=i Σj and σ−i =( σj)j6=i ∈ Σ−i.W ew r i t eσi(ai|ti) for the probability of ai ∈ Ai





j6=i σj(aj|tj) respectively. Let σP ∈ ∆(A) be such that σP(a)=
P
t∈T P(t)σ(a|t) for all a ∈ A.W ec a l lσP an action distribution generated by σ.












for all ti ∈ Ti and a0
i ∈ Ai where P(t−i|ti)=P(ti,t −i)/
P




a∈A P(t)σ(a|t)ui(a,t) be the payoﬀ of strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ to player i ∈ N.
Then, σ ∈ Σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (u,P) i fa n do n l yi f ,f o re a c hi ∈ N,
Ui(σ) ≥ Ui(σ0
i,σ−i) for all σ0
i ∈ Σi.
For given g, consider the following subset of Ti:
T
ui
i = {ti ∈ Ti |ui(a,(ti,t −i)) = gi(a) for all a ∈ A, t−i ∈ T−i with P(ti,t −i) > 0}.
When ti ∈ T
ui
i is realized, payoﬀso fp l a y e ri are given by gi and he knows his payoﬀs.





Deﬁnition 1 An incomplete information game (u,P) is an ε-elaboration of g if P(Tu)=
1 − ε for ε ∈ [0,1].
Payoﬀs of a 0-elaboration are given by g with probability 1 and every player knows
his payoﬀs. It is straightforward to see that if a 0-elaboration has a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium σ ∈ Σ then an action distribution generated by σ, σP ∈ ∆(A), is a correlated
equilibrium of g. Kajii and Morris (1997a, Corollary 3.5) showed the following property
of ε-elaborations, which we will use later.
Lemma 1 Let {(uk,Pk)}∞
k=1 be such that (uk,Pk) is an εk-elaboration of g and εk → 0
as k →∞ .L e tσk be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (uk,Pk) and let σk
P be an action
6distribution generated by σk.T h e n{σk
P}∞
k=1 has a subsequence which converges to some
correlated equilibrium of g.
We say that a set of correlated equilibria of g is robust if, for small ε > 0,e v e r y
ε-elaboration of g has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ such that σP ∈ ∆(A) is close
to some equilibrium in the set.
Deﬁnition 2 A set of correlated equilibria of g, E ⊆ ∆(A),i srobust to all elaborations
in g if, for every δ > 0, there exists ¯ ε > 0 such that, for all ε ≤ ¯ ε,e v e r yε-elaboration of
g has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ such that maxa∈A |µ(a)−σP(a)| ≤ δ for some
µ ∈ E.
If E is a singleton then the equilibrium in E is robust in the sense of Kajii and
Morris (1997a).
Kajii and Morris (1997b) considered a weaker version of the robustness of equilibria
than that of Kajii and Morris (1997a).9 We consider the corresponding version of the ro-
bustness of sets of equilibria. A type ti ∈ Ti\T
ui
i is committed if player i of this type has a
strictly dominant action a
ti
i ∈ Ai such that ui((a
ti
i ,a −i),(ti,t −i)) >u i((ai,a −i),(ti,t −i))
for all ai ∈ Ai\{a
ti
i }, a−i ∈ A−i,a n dt−i ∈ T−i with P(ti,t −i) > 0.A nε-elaboration of
g is canonical if every ti ∈ Ti\T
ui
i is committed for all i ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 3 A set of correlated equilibria of g, E ⊆ ∆(A),i srobust to canonical
elaborations in g if, for every δ > 0, there exists ¯ ε > 0 such that, for all ε ≤ ¯ ε,
every canonical ε-elaboration of g has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ such that
maxa∈A |µ(a) − σP(a)| ≤ δ for some µ ∈ E.
If E is a singleton then the equilibrium in E is robust in the sense of Kajii and
Morris (1997b).
In Section 4, we will provide two suﬃcient conditions for the robustness of sets of
equilibria, one for the robustness to all elaborations and the other for the robustness to
canonical elaborations respectively.
For either of the robustness concepts, if E is robust then a set of correlated equilibria
E0 with E ⊆ E0 is also robust. A robust set E is minimal if no robust set is a proper
subset of E. In this paper, we do not explore the problem of how to identify minimal
robust sets.
9The diﬀerence between them is an open question.
73 Generalized Potentials
Monderer and Shapley (1996) deﬁned weighted potential functions of complete informa-
tion games.
Deﬁnition 4 A function f : A → R is a weighted potential function of g if there exists
wi > 0 such that
gi(ai,a −i) − gi(a0
i,a −i)=wi
¡




for all i ∈ N, ai,a 0
i ∈ Ai,a n da−i ∈ A−i. A complete information game g is a weighted
potential game if it has a weighted potential function. When wi =1for i ∈ N,w ec a l l
f a potential function and g a potential game.













f(ai,a −i) − f(a0
i,a −i)
¢
for all i ∈ N, ai,a 0










for all i ∈ N and λi ∈ ∆(A−i). We generalize (2) to deﬁne generalized potential func-
tions.10
Before providing a formal deﬁnition, we present an example. Let Ai = {0,1,2} for
i ∈ N ≡ {1,2}.W ed e ﬁne a collection of subsets of Ai, Ai = {{0,1},{0,1,2}} for i ∈ N,




0 3, 22 , 30 , 0
1 2, 33 , 20 , 0





10The existence of a function f such that property (2) is satisﬁed is in fact a necessary but not a
suﬃcient condition for g to be a weighted potential game. See the discussion in Section 5 and Morris
and Ui (2002).
8The function F has the following property: for Λi ∈ ∆(Aj) and λi ∈ ∆(Aj) with
λi(0) + λi(1) ≥ Λi({0,1}),











where i 6= j. As we will see later, F is a generalized potential function of g.
To provide the formal deﬁnition, we ﬁrst introduce the domain of a generalized po-
tential function denoted by A.F o r e a c h i ∈ N,l e tAi ⊆ 2Ai\∅ be a covering of Ai.
That is, Ai is a collection of nonempty subsets of Ai such that
S
Xi∈Ai Xi = Ai.T h e
domain of a generalized potential function is A = {
Q
i∈N Xi |Xi ∈ Ai for i ∈ N}.W e
write A−i = {
Q
j6=i Xj |Xj ∈ Aj for j 6= i} and X−i =
Q
j6=i Xj ∈ A−i.N o t et h a tA and
A−i are coverings of A and A−i respectively. We call X ∈ A an action subspace.
We then introduce, for Λi ∈ ∆(A−i), a corresponding subset of ∆(A−i) denoted
by ∆Λi(A−i). Imagine that player i believes that a−i ∈ A−i is chosen in two steps:
ﬁrst, X−i ∈ A−i is chosen according to Λi ∈ ∆(A−i),a n dt h e n ,a−i ∈ X−i is chosen
a c c o r d i n gt os o m eλ
X−i
i ∈ ∆(A−i) such that λ
X−i












for all a−i ∈ A−i.W e w r i t e ∆Λi(A−i) for the set of the beliefs of player i over A−i






i (a−i) for a−i ∈ A−i,
λ
X−i





i (a−i)=1for X−i ∈ A−i}.
Deﬁnition 5 A function F : A → R is a generalized potential function of g if, for all
i ∈ N, Λi ∈ ∆(A−i),a n dλi ∈ ∆Λi(A−i),






i,a −i) 6= ∅
for every







9such that Xi is maximal in the argmax set ordered by the set inclusion relation. An action
subspace X∗ ∈ A is a generalized potential maximizer (GP-maximizer) if F(X∗) >F(X)
for all X ∈ A\{X∗}.
It is clear that F : A → R in the above example is a generalized potential function
because ∆Λi(Aj) ⊆ {λi ∈ ∆(Aj)|λi(0) + λi(1) ≥ Λi({0,1})} where i 6= j.
At the extreme, consider F : A → R such that Ai = {Ai} for all i ∈ N.N o t et h a t
A = {A}. Clearly, every complete information game has a generalized potential function
of this type. At the other extreme, consider F : A → R such that Ai = {{ai}|ai ∈ Ai}
for all i ∈ N.N o t et h a tA = {{a}|a ∈ A}. A weighted potential game has a generalized
potential function of this type, which we prove in Section 5.
Lemma 2 If g is a weighted potential game with a weighted potential function f then
g has a generalized potential function F : A → R such that Ai = {{ai}|ai ∈ Ai} for all
i ∈ N and F({a})=f(a) for all a ∈ A.
Before closing this section, we give a characterization of ∆Λi(A−i).








for all B−i ∈ 2A−i.
This lemma is an immediate consequence of the result of Strassen (1964), which is
well known in the study of Dempster-Shafer theory.11 Dempster-Shafer theory considers
non-additive probability functions called belief functions. Every Λi ∈ ∆(A−i),c a l l e da
basic probability assignment, deﬁnes a corresponding belief function v
Λi









for all B−i ∈ 2A−i. It is known that the correspondence between Λi and v
Λi
i is one-to-







11Dempster (1967, 1968) and Shafer (1976).
10for all B−i ∈ 2A−i.12 Strassen (1964) proved that, for all Λi ∈ ∆(A−i), λi is compatible
with v
Λi
i i fa n do n l yi fλi ∈ ∆Λi(A−i), which is exactly Lemma 3.
4M a i n R e s u l t s
Suppose that g has a generalized potential function F : A → R with a GP-maximizer
X∗.L e tEX∗ be the set of correlated equilibria of g that assign probability 1 to X∗:




Our main results state that EX∗ is nonempty and robust. We present two theorems
below. In Theorem 1, we consider all generalized potential functions and provide a
suﬃcient condition for the robustness to canonical elaborations. In Theorem 2, we
consider a special class of generalized potential functions such that Ai ∈ Ai for all i ∈ N
and provide a suﬃcient condition for the robustness to all elaborations.
Theorem 1 If g has a generalized potential function F : A → R with a GP-maximizer
X∗,t h e nEX∗ is nonempty and robust to canonical elaborations in g.
Theorem 2 If g has a generalized potential function F : A → R with a GP-maximizer
X∗ such that Ai ∈ Ai for all i ∈ N,t h e nEX∗ is nonempty and robust to all elaborations
in g.
If EX∗ is a singleton, then it is a minimal robust set and the equilibrium in EX∗
is robust in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997a, 1997b). Clearly, if a GP-maximizer
consists of one action proﬁle, then EX∗ is a singleton. It is straightforward to see that
EX∗ of the example in the previous section is also a singleton where the GP-maximizer
consists of four action proﬁles.
It should be noted that EX∗ is not always a minimal robust set. For example, if a
generalized potential function is such that Ai = {Ai} for all i ∈ N,t h e nEX∗ is the set of
all correlated equilibria.13 T h ea b o v et h e o r e m sa r eu s e f u lo n l yw h e nw eh a v en o n t r i v i a l
generalized potential functions.
12In literature of non-additive probabilities written by economists, λi is called a core of v
Λi
i because it
is a core when we regard B−i ∈ 2
A−i as a coalition.
13Kajii and Morris (1997a) remarked the robustness of the set of all correlated equilibria.
11In the remainder of this section, we prove Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 simultaneously.
The proof is presented in four steps.
For the ﬁrst step, let (u,P) be an ε-elaboration of g and consider collections of
mappings
Ξi = {ξi : Ti → Ai | for all ti ∈ Ti\T
ui
i , ξi(ti) ∈ Ai contains
every undominated action of type ti},
Ξ = {ξ : T → A|ξ(t)=
Y
i∈N
ξi(ti) for all t ∈ T where ξi ∈ Ξi for all i ∈ N}
w h e r ew es a yt h a tai ∈ Ai is an undominated action of type ti if it is not a strictly
dominated action of type ti.W es a yt h a tai ∈ Ai is a strictly dominated action of type
ti if there exists a0
i ∈ Ai such that ui((a0
i,a −i),(ti,t −i)) >u i((ai,a −i),(ti,t −i)) for all
a−i ∈ A−i and t−i ∈ T−i with P(ti,t −i) > 0.N o t et h a tΞ is nonempty if and only if, for
all i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti\T
ui
i , there exists Xi ∈ Ai such that Xi contains every undominated
action of type ti. As considered in Theorem 1, if (u,P) is canonical and player i of type
ti ∈ Ti\T
ui
i has a strictly dominant action a
ti
i ∈ Ai then Ξ is nonempty because Ai is a
covering of Ai and there exists Xi ∈ Ai such that a
ti
i ∈ Xi.A sc o n s i d e r e di nT h e o r e m
2, if Ai ∈ Ai for all i ∈ N then Ξ is nonempty because Ai contains every action. To
summarize, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4 If (u,P) is canonical then Ξ is nonempty. If Ai ∈ Ai for all i ∈ N then Ξ is
nonempty.





for all ξ ∈ Ξ and consider the set of its maximizers Ξ∗ =a r gm a x ξ∈Ξ V (ξ).
Lemma 5 If Ξ is nonempty then Ξ∗ is nonempty. If ξ∗ ∈ Ξ∗ then
X
t∈T,ξ∗(t)=X∗
P(t) ≥ 1 − εκ
where κ is a positive constant.
12Proof.L e t {ξk ∈ Ξ}∞
k=1 be such that
lim
k→∞
V (ξk)=s u p
ξ∈Ξ
V (ξ).
Let Qk ∈ ∆(T ×A) be such that Qk(t,X)=P(t)δ(ξk(t),X) for all (t,X) ∈ T ×Awhere










P(t)F(ξk(t)) = V (ξk).
We regard {Qk}∞
k=1 as a sequence of probability measures on a discrete metric space
T ×A .N o t e t h a t , f o r e v e r y ε > 0,t h e r ee x i s t saﬁnite subset Sε ⊂ T such that
P
(t,X)∈Sε×A Qk(t,X)=P(Sε) > 1 − ε for all k ≥ 1.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t {Qk}∞
k=1 is
tight because Sε ×Ais ﬁnite and thus compact. Accordingly, by Prohorov’s theorem,14
{Qk}∞
k=1 has a weakly convergent subsequence {Qkl}∞
l=1 such that Qkl → Q∗ as l →∞ .
It is straightforward to see that there exists ξ∗ ∈ Ξ such that





for all (t,X) ∈ T ×A .T h e n
sup
ξ∈Ξ












Therefore, ξ∗ ∈ Ξ∗ and thus Ξ∗ is nonempty.
Let F∗ = F(X∗), F0 =m a x X∈A\{X∗} F(X),a n dF00 =m i n X∈A F(X).N o t e t h a t
F∗ >F0 ≥ F00.L e tξ ∈ Ξ be such that ξi(ti)=X∗
i for all ti ∈ T
ui
i and i ∈ N.W eh a v e








≥ P(Tu)F∗ +( 1− P(Tu))F00 =( 1− ε)F∗ + εF00.




















Combining the above inequalities, we have














P(t) ≥ 1 − εκ
where κ =( F∗ − F00)/(F∗ − F0) > 0.
For the third step, let Ξ be partially ordered by the relation ⊆ such that ξ ⊆ ξ0 for
ξ,ξ0 ∈ Ξ i fa n do n l yi fξi(ti) ⊆ ξ0
i(ti) for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N.
Lemma 6 If Ξ∗ ⊆ Ξ is nonempty, then it contains at least one maximal element. If ξ∗
is a maximal element of Ξ∗,t h e n(u,P) has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ∗ ∈ Σ such
that σ∗(t) ∈ ∆(A) assigns probability 1 to the action subspace ξ∗(t) ∈ A for all t ∈ T,
i.e.,
P
a∈ξ∗(t) σ∗(a|t)=1for all t ∈ T.
Proof. If every linearly ordered subset of Ξ∗ has an upper bound in Ξ∗,t h e nΞ∗ contains
at least one maximal element by Zorn’s Lemma. Let Ξ0 ⊆ Ξ∗ be linearly ordered. Fix
t =( ti)i∈N ∈ T.F o re a c hi ∈ N, observe that
{Xi |Xi = ξ0
i(ti), ξ0 ∈ Ξ0} ⊆ Ai
is linearly ordered by the set inclusion relation. Since this set is ﬁnite, it has a maximum













i(ti).C o n s i d e r{ξ(i,t) |i ∈ N} ⊆ Ξ0. Since this set is linearly ordered








i(ti) for all i ∈ N.F o r ε > 0,c o n s i d e r{ξhti |t ∈ T, P(t) > ε} ⊆ Ξ0.
Since this set is linearly ordered and ﬁnite, it has a maximum element ξhsi.S i m p l y






i(ti) for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N such that





i(ti) for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N.N o t e
that ˜ ξ is an upper bound of Ξ0.S i n c eξε(t)=˜ ξ(t) for t ∈ T with P(t) > ε,i tm u s tb e
true that






This implies that limε→0 |V (˜ ξ) − V (ξε)| =0 .N o t e t h a t V (ξε)=m a x ξ∈Ξ V (ξ) because
ξε ∈ Ξ∗. Therefore, V (˜ ξ)=m a x ξ∈Ξ V (ξ) and thus ˜ ξ ∈ Ξ∗, which completes the proof of
the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h el e m m a .
We prove the second half. Let ξ∗ ∈ Ξ∗ be a maximal element. Let ξ∗










i = {σi ∈ Σi |
P
ai∈ξ∗








j. We show that there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ∗ ∈ Σ∗.
Let βi : Σ∗
−i → 2Σ∗
i be such that βi(σ−i) = argmaxσi∈Σi Ui(σi,σ−i) ∩ Σ∗
i for all
σ−i ∈ Σ∗
−i and β : Σ∗ → 2Σ∗
be such that β(σ)=
Q
i∈N βi(σ−i) for all σ ∈ Σ∗.N o t e
that β is the best response correspondence of (u,P) restricted to Σ∗.
We show that β has nonempty values. This is true if and only if, for all i ∈ N,
σ−i ∈ Σ∗
−i,a n dti ∈ Ti,
ξ∗






P(t−i|ti)σ−i(a−i|t−i)ui((ai,a −i),t) 6= ∅. (3)
Suppose that ti ∈ Ti\T
ui
i . Then (3) is true because ξ∗
i (ti) contains every undominated
action of type ti.
Suppose that ti ∈ T
ui
i . Rewrite the left-hand side of (3) as
ξ∗





































15for all a−i ∈ A−i.B e c a u s eξ∗ is a maximal element of Ξ∗,
ξ∗





























i (X−i)F(Xi × X−i)
and ξ∗
i (ti) is maximal in the argmax set where Λ
ti






















i (a−i)gi(ai,a −i) 6= ∅ (5)
































       
















i (X−i)=0and a−i ∈ X−i,
0 if Λ
ti
i (X−i)=0and a−i 6∈ X−i.




−i(t−i) σ−i(a−i|t−i)=1for all t−i ∈ T−i,w eh a v e
λ
ti,X−i










and thus (5). Therefore, (3) is true by (4) and (5).
16We have shown that β has nonempty values. We can show that Σ∗ is compact15 and
convex and that β has a closed graph and convex values. By Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg
ﬁxed point theorem, β has a ﬁxed point σ∗ ∈ Σ∗, which is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of (u,P).
We now report the fourth and ﬁnal step. An immediate implication of the above
lemmas is the following. If (u,P) is canonical (the case considered in Theorem 1), or if
Ai ∈ Ai for all i ∈ N (the case considered in Theorem 2), then (u,P) has a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium σ∗ ∈ Σ such that
P




















P(t) ≥ 1 − εκ
(6)
where ξ∗ is a maximal element of Ξ∗. Thus, to complete the proof, it is enough to show
that, for every δ > 0, there exists ¯ ε > 0 such that, for all ε ≤ ¯ ε and every ε-elaboration
with a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ∗ satisfying (6), there exists µ ∈ EX∗ such that
maxa∈A |µ(a) − σ∗
P(a)| ≤ δ.
Seeking a contradiction, suppose otherwise. Then, for some δ > 0, there exists a
sequence {(uk,Pk)}∞
k=1 such that:
• (uk,Pk) is an εk-elaboration of g and εk → 0 as k →∞ .
• (uk,Pk) has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ∗k with
P
a∈X∗ σ∗k




P (a)| > δ for all µ ∈ EX∗ or EX∗ = ∅.
By Lemma 1, {σ∗k
P }∞











where µ ∈ ∆(A) is a correlated equilibrium of g. Because
X
a∈X∗






P (a) ≥ lim
l→∞
(1 − εklκ)=1 ,
we have µ ∈ EX∗. This is a contradiction, which completes the proof of the theorems.
15A strategy subspace Σ
∗ is compact with the topology of weak convergence deﬁned in {ρσ ∈ ∆(T ×
A)|σ ∈ Σ
∗, ρσ(t,a)=P(t)σ(a|t) for all (t,a) ∈ T × A}.
175U n o r d e r e d D o m a i n s
We restrict attention to the class of generalized potential functions such that domains
are partitions of action spaces. Let Pi ⊆ 2Ai\∅ be a partition of Ai.W e w r i t e P =
{
Q
i∈N Xi |Xi ∈ Pi for i ∈ N} and P−i = {
Q
j6=i Xj |Xj ∈ Pj for j 6= i},w h i c ha r e
partitions of A and A−i, respectively. The partition element of Pi containing ai ∈ Ai is
denoted by Pi(ai). Similarly, the partition element of P containing a and that of P−i
containing a−i are denoted by P(a) and P−i(a−i), respectively. We say that a function
v : A → R is P-measurable if v(a)=v(a0) for a,a0 ∈ A with a0 ∈ P(a).
Deﬁnition 6 A P-measurable function v : A → R is a best-response potential function
of g if, for each i ∈ N,






i,a −i) 6= ∅
for all Xi ∈ Pi and λi ∈ ∆(A−i) such that







A partition element X∗ ∈ P is a best-response potential maximizer (BRP-maximizer) if
v(a∗) >v (a) for all a∗ ∈ X∗ and a 6∈ X∗.
For example, consider the special case where Pi is the ﬁnest partition, i.e., Pi =
{{ai}}ai∈Ai for all i ∈ N. Then, it is straightforward to see that a function v : A → R is














for all i ∈ N and λi ∈ ∆(A−i).16 For example, a weighted potential function is a
best-response potential function by (2). However, a best-response potential function
is not always a weighted potential function, even if there are no dominated actions,
as demonstrated by Morris and Ui (2002). Thus the class of best-response potential
functions is much larger than the class of weighted potential functions.
16A best-response potential function considered by Voorneveld (2000) is a function satisfying this
condition for the class of beliefs such that λi(a−i)=0or 1. Thus, best-response potential functions in
this paper form a special class of those in Voorneveld (2000).
18A best-response potential function v induces a generalized potential function. Let
F : A → R be such that A = P and F(P(a)) = v(a) for all a ∈ A.N o t e t h a t
P-measurability of v implies that F is well deﬁned. Since A−i is a partition of A−i,
λi ∈ ∆Λi(A−i) if and only if
P
a−i∈X−i λi(a−i)=Λi(X−i) for all X−i ∈ A−i by Lemma 3.











i). This implies that, if






















i,a −i) 6= ∅
for all λi ∈ ∆Λi(A−i) by the deﬁnition of best-response potential functions. Therefore,
F : A → R is a generalized potential function. This proves Lemma 2 and immediately
implies the following result by Theorem 1.
Proposition 1 If g has a best-response potential function v : A → R w i t haB R P -
maximizer X∗,t h e nEX∗ is nonempty and robust to canonical elaborations in g.
This proposition generalizes the result of Ui (2001), who showed that the action
proﬁle that uniquely maximizes a potential function is robust to canonical elaborations.
6O r d e r e d D o m a i n s
Let Pi be a partition of Ai such that Pi is linearly ordered by the order relation ≤i for
i ∈ N.L e tZi and Zi be the smallest and the largest elements of Pi, respectively. The
corresponding product order relation over P is denoted by ≤N, and that over P−i is
denoted by ≤−i, respectively. If Pi(ai) ≤i Zi for ai ∈ Ai and Zi ∈ Pi,w es i m p l yw r i t e
ai ≤i Zi.F o rXi ⊆ Ai,w es a yt h a tai ∈ Xi is minimal in Xi if ai ≤i Pi(xi) for all xi ∈ Xi
and that ai ∈ Xi is maximal in Xi if ai ≥i Pi(xi) for all xi ∈ Xi.
19Deﬁnition 7 Let X∗ ∈ P be given. A P-measurable function v : A → R with v(a∗) >
v(a) for all a∗ ∈ X∗ and a 6∈ X∗ is a monotone potential function of g if, for all i ∈ N
and λi ∈ ∆(A−i),t h e r ee x i s t s
















such that Pi(ai) ≥i Pi(ai), and symmetrically, there exists
















such that Pi(ai) ≤i Pi(ai). A partition element X∗ ∈ P is called a monotone potential
maximizer (MP-maximizer).
We restrict attention to a complete information game g satisfying strategic comple-
mentarities or a monotone potential function v satisfying strategic complementarities in
the following sense.
Deﬁnition 8 A complete information game g satisﬁes strategic complementarities if,
for each i ∈ N,
gi(ai,a −i) − gi(a0




for all ai,a 0
i ∈ Ai and a−i,a 0
−i ∈ A−i such that Pi(ai) >i Pi(a0
i) and P−i(a−i) >−i
P−i(a0
−i). A function v : A → R satisﬁes strategic complementarities if an identical
interest game g with gi = v for all i ∈ N satisﬁes strategic complementarities.
Note that if the partition Pi is the ﬁnest one, then the order relation ≤i naturally
induces an order relation over the action set Ai and the above deﬁnition of strategic
complementarities reduces to the standard one.
A monotone potential function v with an MP-maximizer X∗ induces a generalized
potential function with a GP-maximizer X∗ if g or v satisﬁes strategic complementarities.









20for i ∈ N where [Z0
i,Z00









Note that [Zi,Zi]=Ai ∈ Ai.F o r Z0
−i,Z00
−i ∈ P−i with Z0
−i ≤−i Z00
−i and Z0,Z00 ∈ P
































A = {[Z0,Z00]|Z0,Z00 ∈ P,Z 0 ≤N X∗ ≤N Z00}.
Note that, for [Z0
i,Z00
i ] ∈ Ai and [Z0
−i,Z00
−i] ∈ A−i, [Z0,Z00]=[ Z0
i,Z00
i ] × [Z0
−i,Z00
−i] ∈ A.
Let F : A → R be such that
F([Z0,Z00]) = V (Z0)+V (Z00)
where V : P → R is such that V (P(a)) = v(a) for all a ∈ A, which is well deﬁned by
P-measurability of v.N o t et h a tF(X∗) >F(X) for all X ∈ A\{X∗}. By showing that
F is a generalized potential function, we claim the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that g has a monotone potential function v : A → R with an
MP-maximizer X∗.I fg or v satisﬁes strategic complementarities, then EX∗ is nonempty
and robust to all elaborations in g.
Proof. By Theorem 2, it is enough to show that F : A → R given above is a generalized
potential function of g with a GP-maximizer X∗.
For Λi ∈ ∆(A−i),l e tZ∗
i ,Z∗∗
i ∈ Pi be such that
[Z∗
i ,Z∗∗

























λi(a−i)gi(xi,a −i) 6= ∅ (7)




























































































































−i,Z −i]) if Z−i ≥−i X∗
−i,
0 otherwise.





for all Z−i ∈ P−i. We show that Γ00
i ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Γi and Γi ﬁrst
order stochastically dominates Γ0
i.W e s a y t h a t Q−i ⊆ P−i is a decreasing subset of
22P−i if Z−i ∈ Q−i and Z0
−i ≤−i Z−i together imply Z0
−i ∈ Q−i. The deﬁnition of the
stochastic dominance relation says that Γ00
i ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Γi if, for








It is known that Γ00
i ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Γi if and only if, for any increasing








We show (8) for two cases separately, X∗
−i 6∈ Q−i and X∗
−i ∈ Q−i.I fX∗
−i 6∈ Q−i,t h e n
Z−i ≥−i X∗








i (Z−i)=0unless Z−i ≥−i X∗
−i.I fX∗































































i ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Γi. Symmetrically, we can show that
Γi ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Γ0
i.
17We say that Gi : P−i → R is increasing if Gi(Z−i) ≥ Gi(Z
0
−i) for Z−i ≥−i Z
0
−i.
23Using the stochastic dominance relation, we show that
[Z∗
i ,X∗





λi(a−i)gi(xi,a −i) 6= ∅, (9)
[X∗
i ,Z∗∗





λi(a−i)gi(xi,a −i) 6= ∅, (10)
which imply (7). For Z−i ∈ P−i,l e tλ
Z−i





    
    
λi(a−i)
Γi(Z−i)
if Γi(Z−i) > 0 and a−i ∈ Z−i,
1
|Z−i|
if Γi(Z−i)=0and a−i ∈ Z−i,









i (a−i) for all








































i(Z−i)V (Pi(xi) × Z−i).











is minimal in the argmax set. Let






24be minimal in the argmax set and let














be maximal in the argmax sets, respectively. Since v is a monotone potential function, it
must be true that Pi(ai) ≤i Pi(bi) and Pi(a0
i) ≤i Pi(b0
i). Suppose that g satisﬁes strategic
complementarities. For any xi ∈ Ai with Pi(xi) <i Pi(b0
i),
gi(b0
i,a −i) − gi(xi,a −i) ≥ gi(b0
i,a 0
−i) − gi(xi,a 0
−i)
whenever P−i(a−i) >−i P−i(a0



















i,a −i) − gi(xi,a −i)
¢
whenever Z−i >−i Z0







i,a −i) − gi(xi,a −i)
¢
is
increasing in Z−i.S i n c eΓi ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Γ0










































i,a −i) − gi(xi,a −i)
¢
≥ 0.
This implies that Pi(b0
i) ≤i Pi(bi).T h e r e f o r e , Z∗
i = Pi(a0
i) ≤i Pi(b0
i) ≤i Pi(bi) and
thus (9) is true. Suppose that v satisﬁes strategic complementarities. By the similar











































i,a −i) − v(xi,a −i)
¢
> 0.
25This implies that Pi(a0
i) ≤i Pi(ai). Therefore, Z∗
i = Pi(a0
i) ≤i Pi(ai) ≤i Pi(bi) and thus
(9) is true.
To summarize, if either g or v satisﬁes strategic complementarities, (9) is true. Sim-
ilarly, we can show that (10) is true. Therefore, we obtain (7).
We can obtain the simpler form of the MP-maximizer condition if a complete infor-
mation game satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns. We say that a complete information
game satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns if every player’s payoﬀ function is concave
with respect to his own action. Let Z+
i ∈ Pi be the smallest element larger than Zi 6= Zi,
and Z−
i ∈ Pi be the largest element smaller than Zi 6= Zi.
Deﬁnition 9 A complete information game g satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns if,
for each i ∈ N and a−i ∈ A−i,
gi(a+
i ,a −i) − gi(ai,a −i) ≤ gi(ai,a −i) − gi(a−
i ,a −i)
for ai 6∈ Zi ∪ Zi, a+
i ∈ Pi(ai)+,a n da−
i ∈ Pi(ai)−.
In the case of diminishing marginal returns, we will see that the MP-maximizer
condition reduces to the following simpler condition.
Deﬁnition 10 Let X∗ ∈ P be given. A P-measurable function v : A → R with v(a∗) >
v(a) for all a∗ ∈ X∗ and a 6∈ X∗ is a local potential function of g if, for each i ∈ N,
ai ∈ Zi with Zi >i X∗


















and symmetrically, for each i ∈ N, ai ∈ Zi with Zi <i X∗


















A partition element X∗ ∈ P is called a local potential maximizer (LP-maximizer).
26We show that if a complete information game satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns,
then a local potential function is a monotone potential function, by which we claim the
following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose that g has a local potential function v : A → R with an LP-
maximizer X∗.I fg satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns, and if g or v satisﬁes strategic
complementarities, then EX∗ is nonempty and robust to all elaborations in g.
Proof. By Proposition 2, it is enough to show that if g satisﬁes diminishing marginal
returns, then a local potential function v is a monotone potential function. Let






be maximal in the argmax set and let






be minimal in the argmax set. We prove that Pi(ai) ≥i Pi(ai).I f Pi(ai)=Zi,t h e n
Pi(ai) ≥i Pi(ai).I f Pi(ai) 6= Zi,t h e nPi(ai)






























for all xi ≤i Pi(ai)− and x−







for all xi ≤i Pi(ai)−. Therefore, it must be true that Pi(ai) ≥i Pi(ai).
27Symmetrically, let






be minimal in the argmax set and let






be maximal in the argmax set. By the symmetric argument, we can prove that Pi(ai) ≤i
Pi(ai).
Combining the above arguments, we conclude that a local potential function v is a
monotone potential function.






i} for all i ∈ N and an LP-maximizer is {a∗}.N o t e t h a t a c o m -
plete information game satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns in the trivial sense. It is
straightforward to see that a function v : A → R is a local potential function with an
LP-maximizer {a∗} i fa n do n l yi f
• v(a∗) >v (a) for a 6= a∗,
• for all i ∈ N, v(ai,a −i)=v(a0
i,a −i) for ai,a 0
i ∈ Ai\{a∗
i} and a−i ∈ A−i,
















for ai 6= a∗
i.
One can show that if g has a p-dominant equilibrium a∗ with
P
i∈N pi < 1,t h e n
g has a local potential function v of this type. Let p =( pi)i∈N ∈ [0,1]N.K a j i i a n d
28Morris (1997a) deﬁned a∗ ∈ A to be a p-dominant equilibrium of g if, for all i ∈ N and









for ai ∈ Ai. Kajii and Morris (1997a) showed that a p-dominant equilibrium with
P
i∈N pi < 1 is robust to all elaborations. This is an immediate consequence of Propo-
sition 3, the above discussion and the following lemma.
Lemma 7 If g has a p-dominant equilibrium a∗ with
P
i∈N pi < 1,t h e ng has a local







i∈N pi if a = a∗,
−
P
i∈S pi if ai = a∗
i for i ∈ S and ai 6= a∗
i for i 6∈ S.
In addition, v satisﬁes strategic complementarities.
Proof.N o t e t h a t v is P-measurable and v(a∗) >v (a) for a 6= a∗.N o t ea l s ot h a t
v(a∗




1 − pi if a−i = a∗
−i,
−pi otherwise
for ai 6= a∗
i.T h u s ,v satisﬁes strategic complementarities.












−i) − pi ≥ 0.
Because a∗ is a p-dominant equilibrium, (12) is true, which completes the proof.
Local potential functions have the following dual characterization, which is easier to
apply in ﬁnding local potential functions. We use it when we discuss examples. The dual
characterization translates the condition with respect to beliefs to the condition with re-
spect to payoﬀ diﬀerences.18 Remember that, in weighted potential functions, the payoﬀ
diﬀerence condition (1) leads to the belief condition (2). The following lemma provides
the payoﬀ diﬀerence condition corresponding to the belief condition in Deﬁnition 10.
18See Morris and Ui (2002) for the duality argument between beliefs and payoﬀ diﬀerences.
29Lemma 8 Let X∗ ∈ P be given. A P-measurable function v : A → R with v(a∗) >v (a)
for all a∗ ∈ X∗ and a 6∈ X∗ is a local potential function of g if and only if, for each
i ∈ N,t h e r ee x i s t sµi(a−









i ,a −i) − v(ai,a −i)
¢
for all a−i ∈ A−i, and symmetrically, there exists µi(a+










i ,a −i) − v(ai,a −i)
¢
for all a−i ∈ A−i.

































i ,a −i) − gi(ai,a −i)
¢
≥ 0.
Thus, v satisﬁes the ﬁrst half of the condition in Deﬁnition 10. By the symmetric
argument, we can show that v also satisﬁes the second half. Therefore, v is a local
potential function.
Suppose that v is a local potential function. To show that µi(a−
i ,a i) and µi(a+
i ,a i)
exist, we use Farkas’ Lemma.19 Farkas’ Lemma says that, for ﬁnite dimensional vectors
a0,a1,...,am ∈ Rn, the following two conditions are equivalent.
• If (a1,y),...,(am,y) ≤ 0 for y ∈ Rn,t h e n(a0,y) ≤ 0.
• There exists x1,...,x m ≥ 0 such that x1a1 + ···+ xmam = a0.
19See textbooks of convex analysis such as Rockafellar (1970).















i ,a −i) − gi(ai,a −i)
¢
≥ 0.







i ,a −i) − v(ai,a −i)
¢
≤ 0,








i ,a −i) − gi(ai,a −i)
¢
≤ 0.















i ,a −i) − gi(ai,a −i)
¢
for all a−i ∈ A−i where δa0
−i : A−i → R is such that δa0





i ,a −i) − gi(ai,a −i) ≥ x
¡
v(a−
i ,a −i) − v(ai,a −i)
¢
and we can choose µi(a−
i ,a i)=x. Symmetrically, we can show the existence of µi(a+
i ,a i),
which completes the proof.
We report a couple of generalized potential functions using the local potential function
characterization.
Example 1
For i ∈ N = {1,...,n},l e tAi = {1,2} and Pi = {{1},{2}} where Pi is linearly ordered
by the rule {1} ≤i {2}.N o t et h a tg satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns in the trivial
sense. By Lemma 8, v : A → R is a local potential function with an LP-maximizer
{1} = {(1,...,1)} i fa n do n l yi fv(1) >v (a) for all a 6= 1 and there exists µi ≥ 0 such
that gi(1,a −i) − gi(2,a −i) ≥ µi (v(1,a −i) − v(2,a −i)) for all a−i ∈ A−i and i ∈ N.





yi if a = 1,
zi if a = 2,
0 otherwise
where yi,z i > 0 for all i ∈ N.N o t e t h a t g satisﬁes strategic complementarities. A
function v : A → R is a local potential function with an LP-maximizer {1} if and only
if v(1) >v (a) for all a 6= 1 and there exists µi ≥ 0 such that yi ≥ µi (v(1) − v(2,1−i)),
−zi ≥ µi (v(1,2−i) − v(2)),a n d0 ≥ µi (v(1,a −i) − v(2,a −i)) for a−i 6= 1−i,2−i, for all
i ∈ N.B e c a u s e zi > 0,w em u s th a v eµi > 0 and v(1,2−i) − v(2) < 0. Then, we can
show that the above condition implies that yi/µi >z j/µj for all i 6= j.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
{1} is an LP-maximizer only if there exists µi > 0 for i ∈ N such that yi/µi >z j/µj for
all i 6= j. We show this when i =1and j = n.L e t{ak ∈ A}n
k=0 be such that, for each
k, ak
i =1if i>kand ak
i =2if i ≤ k.N o t et h a ta0 = 1 and an = 2.W eh a v e
y1/µ1 ≥ v(a0) − v(a1),
0 ≥ v(ak−1) − v(ak) for k ∈ {2,...,n− 1},
−zn/µn ≥ v(an−1) − v(an).






= v(a0) − v(an)=v(1) − v(2) > 0.
It should be noted that there exist an open set of games that do not have any
local potential function. For example, all games in the neighborhood of the following
unanimity game do not have a local potential function with an LP-maximizer {1} or {2}.
Let N = {1,2,3}, y1 =6 , y2 = y3 =1 , z1 = z2 = z3 =2 .I f {1} is an LP-maximizer,
then it must be true that 1/µ2 > 2/µ3 and 1/µ3 > 2/µ2 , which implies that 1 > 4.
Thus, {1} is not an LP-maximizer. If {2} is an LP-maximizer, then it must be true
that 2/µ2 > 6/µ1 and 2/µ1 > 1/µ2, which implies that 4 > 6.T h u s , {2} is not an
LP-maximizer.
Example 2
For i ∈ N = {1,...,n},l e tAi = {0,1,2} and Pi = {{0,1},{2}} where Pi is linearly
o r d e r e db yt h er u l e{0,1} ≤i {2}.N o t et h a tg satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns in
the trivial sense. By Lemma 8, a P-measurable function v : A → R is a local potential
32function with an LP-maximizer X∗ = {0,1}N i fa n do n l yi fv(a∗) >v (a) for all a∗ ∈ X∗
and a 6∈ X∗, and there exists µ0
i,µ 1
i ≥ 0 such that
gi(0,a −i) − gi(2,a −i) ≥ µ0
i (v(0,a −i) − v(2,a −i)),
gi(1,a −i) − gi(2,a −i) ≥ µ1
i (v(1,a −i) − v(2,a −i))
for all a−i ∈ A−i and i ∈ N.





yi(a) if a ∈ X∗,
zi if a = 2,
0 otherwise
where yi : X∗ → R is such that yi(a) > 0 for all a ∈ X∗ and zi > 0.N o t et h a tg satisﬁes
strategic complementarities. A P-measurable function v : A → R is a local potential
function with an LP-maximizer X∗ i fa n do n l yi fv(a∗) >v (a) for all a∗ ∈ X∗ and
a 6∈ X∗,a n dt h e r ee x i s t sµ
ai
i ≥ 0 for ai ∈ {0,1} such that yi(a) ≥ µ
ai
i (v(a) − v(2,a −i))
for a−i ∈ X∗
−i, −zi ≥ µ
ai
i (v(ai,2−i) − v(2)),a n d0 ≥ µ
ai
i (v(a) − v(2,a −i)) for a−i 6∈
X∗
−i ∪ {2−i},f o ra l li ∈ N.N o t et h a tµ
ai
i > 0 and v(ai,2−i) − v(2) < 0 because zi > 0.
In general, a robust set induced by the LP-maximizer, EX∗, is not a singleton. For
example, let N = {1,2,3} and zi =1for all i ∈ N. Let the restricted game (yi)i∈N
be the cyclic matching pennies game; each player’s payoﬀs depend only on his own
action and the action of his “adversary.” Player 3’s adversary is player 2, player 2’s
adversary is player 1, and player 1’s adversary is player 3. Thus, for example, player
1’s payoﬀs are completely independent of player 2’s action. Every player tries to choose
action diﬀerent from his adversary’s. Player 1’s restricted payoﬀ function is such that
y1(1,0,a 3)=y1(0,1,a 3)=3and y1(1,1,a 3)=y1(0,0,a 3)=2for all a3 ∈ {0,1}.T h e





2 if a ∈ X∗,
1 if a = 2,
0 otherwise
is a local potential function and X∗ is an LP-maximizer. Thus, EX∗ is a robust set. By
the discussion of Example 3.1 of Kajii and Morris (1997a), EX∗ is not a singleton and
any single correlated equilibrium in EX∗ is not robust.
33Frankel et al. (2001) report further discussion of singleton GP-maximizers for games
with strategic complementarities and diminishing marginal returns, using the LP-maximizer
condition. For example, they show that a two player, three action, symmetric payoﬀ
game in that class always has an LP-maximizer and give an example of a two player,
four action, symmetric payoﬀ game with no LP-maximizer.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper introduces generalized potential functions and provides suﬃcient conditions
for the robustness of sets of equilibria. The special cases of the conditions unify the
suﬃcient conditions for the robustness of equilibria provided by Kajii and Morris (1997a)
and Ui (2001).
There are several open questions concerning the robustness of equilibria to incomplete
information. Our “potential” technique could help with investigating them. One of the
basic questions is when robust equilibria are unique if they exist. Kajii and Morris
(1997a) showed that a strictly p-dominant equilibrium with
P
i∈N pi < 1 is the unique
robust equilibrium. We do not ﬁnd examples of generic games with multiple robust
equilibria. However, we do not yet conclude whether or not robust equilibria of generic
games are unique if they exist. Using generalized potential functions, we can make
examples of robust equilibria of various games, which could help with investigating the
question.
This paper is the ﬁrst step in studying the robustness of sets of equilibria. Topics for
the future work include the problem of how to identify minimal robust sets.
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